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high importance of patents is associated with a higher innovative capacity, iii) 
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patents depending on the agents engaged in these activities, and v) patents seem to work 
as complements rather than substitutes for other appropriability mechanisms. 
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1  Introduction 
This paper investigates how firms’ various attributes affect their perception as to 
the importance of patents and how firms’ perception of the relevance of various 
appropriability mechanisms is related to the importance of patents. Although 
researchers’ interest in firms’ propensity to patent is not particularly new (e.g. Scherer, 
1965), as far as we know there has not been any effort to detect how firms’ perceptions 
as to the importance of various appropriability mechanisms affect the importance firms 
assign to patents. Thus, it is this vacuum that this piece of work will primarily try to fill. 
There have been many attempts to empirically investigate firms’ propensities to 
patent (Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Blind et al., 2006; Brower and Kleinknecht, 1999; 
Duguet and Kabla, 2000; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Mansfield, 1986; Scherer, 1965, 
1983). Most studies look either at the number of patents issued (either total figures or 
normalized by R&D outlays) or at the proportion of inventions/innovations patented. In 
many ways this is both their strength and weakness. The strength is that these studies 
have the merit of encompassing the multi-purpose role of patents (i.e. protection against 
copying, bargaining chips, signalling, and so on) since this appropaibility mechanism is 
used not only for protecting inventions against copying (Granstrand, 1999; Pitkethly, 
2001) but also for other strategic purposes (e.g. access to other firms’ knlowledge base). 
The weakness is that by looking at patent numbers the results may overestimate how 
important is the fundamental attribute of patents, that is stopping others from copying. 
Our approach in this paper is distinct from prior studies because we focus on the 
ability that various appropriability mechanisms have in protecting innovations from 
being freely replicated and commercialized by third parties. In doing so, we shall be   3
able to better understand how patents and other appropriation methods interact, which is 
an issue that has recently called attention of researchers. However, to date our 
knowledge is not yet comprehensive for a number of reasons. Firstly, previous studies 
have focused mainly on how patents are related to secrecy (e.g. Cassiman et al., 2002; 
Graham, 2003). Secondly, early effort has concentrated upon few industrial sectors (e.g. 
Graham and Somaya, 2004). Finally, other attempts have not been designed for that 
particular purpose (e.g. Levin et al., 1987; Sattler, 2003). This paper adds to this 
emerging literature by looking at firms in UK manufacturing and how patents are 
related to seven methods of protection. 
Our analysis derives from responses of firms to questions in the third UK 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS 3). The main advantage of the third round of this 
survey over previous ones is the larger sample size. Of the 8172 total responses 
gathered, 3440 are from manufacturing. This represents nearly 7.5% of the whole 
population of manufacturing firms according to the Inter-Departmental Business 
Register. Further, the design of the questionnaire itself has improved over the years, 
though some of the more fundamental disadvantages of questionnaire data of this kind 
might be impossible to overcome. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section the literature on firms’ 
propensities to patent is reviewed, focusing on definitions used and on empirical 
findings. In the third section details about both the data set and the framework for data 
analysis are given. Then, the results are shown and discussed in the fourth section. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn.   4
2  Literature review 
As there are conditions governing the granting of patents (e.g. patent 
legislation), one cannot expect that all firms are able to secure property rights. 
Moreover, although it is intuitive that firms that hold more patents are more innovative, 
this can be misleading (Schmookler, 1954, 1962). It is misleading because it does not 
account for the effects of, for example, firms’ size (Scherer, 1965), or the industry’s 
competitive structure (Comanor, 1967). Thus, it is fair to say that the interest in firms’ 
propensities to patent emerged largely due to deficiencies that patents per se have as 
indicators of innovative activity. This line of research has attempted to detect the 
characteristics of firms that make them more inclined to apply for patents rather than 
using raw patent numbers to measure firms’ level of innovativeness. 
There are two main definitions of what is meant by propensity to patent
1. The 
first, to the best of our knowledge, dates back to Scherer in 1965. Scherer (1965, 1983) 
measures propensity to patent as the number of patents per unit of R&D input. His 
definition may be valuable if one takes into account the availability of such statistics 
publicly. Nevertheless, Scherer’s definition does not allow for possible ‘interferences’ 
in the patents-R&D relationship, such as i) the efficiency of R&D, ii) the reasons why 
firms patent, iii) technological opportunities, and iv) the possible undercounted R&D in 
small firms. Scherer also used the number of patents as a response variable in estimation 
models in order to investigate what determines a firm’s propensity to patent. This 
practice seems to have been used more often recently due to advances in the 
econometrics of count data (e.g. Gourieroux et al., 1984; Hausman et al., 1984). 
                                                 
1 Arundel and Kabla (1998) revise a broader scope of definitions.   5
The second main definition of a firm’s propensity to patent is based upon the 
proportion of inventions/innovations that are patented. The first attempt to use this 
definition was made by Mansfield (1986) who asked US firms the proportion of their 
patentable inventions that were patented. Mansfield’s definition has the merit of 
avoiding the R&D productivity problem but has the disadvantage of underestimating the 
value of patents because many inventions do not necessarily become innovations and 
therefore have little or no economic consequence. In an attempt to overcome this 
problem many variants of this definition have been used recently (e.g. Arundel and 
Kabla, 1998; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Duguet and Kabla, 2000). 
The results derived from previous studies on the propensity to patent agree to a 
certain degree around particular issues. For example, firm size seems to play an 
important role in determining the number of patents (Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; 
Scherer, 1965, 1983). R&D outlays are also seen as a major factor in determining a 
higher propensity to patent (Duguet and Kabla, 2000). Collaborative arrangements, in 
particular innovation-oriented collaborations, may also increase firms’ propensities to 
patent (Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999). However, when joint-effort to foster 
innovation involves government organisations, the propensity to patent is low (Scherer, 
1983). This result may arise from either the presence of well-established firms whose 
future market position is not particularly dependent on taking out a lot of patents 
(Griliches, 1990); or because the government supports some industries and insists upon 
either title or a royalty-free license to any inventions made under its contracts (Scherer, 
1983); or the level of uncertainty attached to R&D is very high (Taylor and Silberston, 
1973). But according to Scherer (1983) within particular industries that receive   6
government support, the propensity to patent may be high due to the supplementation of 
the invention-generating potential of company-financed R&D.  
Firms’ propensities to patent also vary across industrial sectors. Empirical 
evidence suggests that differences in technological opportunities are thought to be a 
major determinant of that variability (Scherer, 1983). Moreover, incentives peculiar to 
individual industries, such as the relevance of patents to different sectors, may help in 
determining different propensities to patent (Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999). Market 
power, however, seems to have only a modest positive effect on the number of patents, 
though its intensity may vary by country (Duguet and Kabla, 2000; Scherer, 1983). A 
higher degree of competition is conducive to a higher propensity to patent (Arundel and 
Kabla, 1998). Firms with overseas sales also tend to obtain more patents than those with 
domestic operations only (Scherer, 1983). 
Another possible explanation for differences in the propensity to patent lies in 
environmental factors not related to firm and market structures. These factors constitute 
what Teece (1986) coined ‘regimes of appropriability’. Regimes of appropriability may 
not only induce firms to pursue patent protection but also to explain when they are not 
worth using as a protective device. Acccording to Teece (1986) a tight appropriability 
regime means that technology is relatively easy to protect whereas a weak 
appropriability regime means that it is almost impossible to protect a technology. These 
regimes derive, in particular, from the nature of technology and the efficacy of legal 
mechanisms. By nature of technology Teece means whether it is product or process 
oriented, and also the extent that the knowledge involved is tacit or codified. By 
efficacy of legal mechanisms, Teece means the extent that intellectual property rights   7
can be enforced. Nonetheless, one should be cautious when analysing sectoral 
differences in propensities to patent. Even within individual industries one can observe 
a large variability in firms’ propensities to patent (Mansfield, 1986). An explanation for 
this variability is that firms also pursue patents for defensive strategic reasons (Blind et 
al., 2006), such as to avoid hold up (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). 
It is expected and is, in fact, observed that the likelihood of applying for patents 
increases with an increase in the perceived effectiveness of patents (Arundel and Kabla, 
1998). But in concentrating upon patents applied for or issued previous studies may 
overestimate how important is the fundamental attribute of patents, which is stopping 
others from copying. It is therefore both of importance and of interest to explore the 
basic role of the patent system itself (i.e. to incentivise innovation by providing 
protection against deliberate imitation). This is going to be addressed in this paper by 
empirically identifying what makes firms assign more (or less) importance to patents as 
a mechanism of protection. In providing evidence of what firm attributes are related to 
the perception of a higher importance for patents as a mechanism of protection we hope 
to advance our current knowledge as to whether patents are serving one of their central 
purposes. 
In addition, there is an emerging literature (e.g. Cassiman et al., 2002; Graham, 
2003; Graham and Somaya, 2004; Sattler, 2003) that has attempted to detect whether 
patents are either complements or substitutes for other appropriability mechnaisms (or 
vice-versa). But there has not been any attempt to investigate whether the perceived 
importance of one particular mechanisms is related to firms’ perceptions as to the 
importance of patents. Earlier studies have addressed to a certaing degree this issue as to   8
the relationship between patents and other appropribility mechanisms. For example, 
Bresnahan (1985), in studying the plain paper copier market after Xerox’s monopoly 
ended, noticed that this firm used patents to complement its leading position in that 
technology field. Hounshell and Smith (1988) described patents and trade secrets being 
used concurrently by German dye firms. This preliminary evidence suggests that patents 
may complement other appropriability mechanisms. In turn, one of the most relevant 
studies on the use of patents in the US suggests the contrary. The study by Levin et al. 
(1987) indicates that patents and other mechanisms tend not to be used together. Using 
factor analysis and cluster analysis techniques the authors deteceted that the studied 
mechanisms of appropriability could be reduced to two dimensions: i) patents, and ii) 
other non-intellectual property rights (lead-time, secrecy, learning curve advantages). 
However, they recognize that this is not robust evidence since the data did not reduce 
satisfactorily to these two dimensions. 
More recently a few studies have addressed this issue. Graham (2003), for 
example, has investigated the use of submarine
2 patents in the US and has concluded 
that patents and secrecy can be complements. Another effort that focused on the US 
software industry has extended that possible complementary role of patents from 
secrecy to copyrights and trademarks (Graham and Somaya, 2004). Sattler (2003), using 
an approach similar to Levin et al. (1987) but to study German firms, has detected that 
patents may complement other forms of intellectual property rights; in particular, design 
registration. However, his findings indicate that secrecy, complexity of design, long-
                                                 
2 This term refers to patents that make use of continuation patent applications to delay patent grants, and hence to 
prolong the period that patents applications are kept secret. This practice, however, is no longer possible due to 
changes in the US patent system.   9
term employment relationships and lead-time are likely to be substitutes to patents in 
appropriating the benefits from innovation. 
To date the results are nor conclusive, and in carrying out this investigation we 
hope to add to the current knowledge. Thus, this study differs from existing studies for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, in looking solely at the exclusionary side of patents, 
distortions caused by several motivations behind patent applications, reflected in patent 
numbers, are minimized. Secondly, in identifying the attributes that impact on the 
perceived importance of patents for protection against copying, based upon data and 
research method accordingly, we hope to avoid distortions caused by not-controlling for 
important elements affecting that perception (industrial sector, for example). Finally, in 
investigating the releationship between patents and other appropriability mechanisms 
the results may help managers, on the basis of their business, assess more clearly 
whether or not patents should be pursued in tanden with other mechanisms. 
3  Data, variables, and analytical framework 
3.1  The Dataset 
The data source used to examine determinants of the importance of patents as 
protective devices is the third round of the UK Community Innovation Survey (CIS 3). 
The Community Innovation Survey is a pan-European effort to gather information on 
the extent and level of technological innovation activity at firm-level. It produces 
indicators of innovative output and qualitative information on several innovation related 
issues, such as the importance of patents. 
The CIS 3 was designed in accordance with other EU Member States, and it was 
administered in the UK by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on behalf of the   10
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). In the UK it was a voluntary survey addressed 
to firms with more than 10 employees in both manufacturing and services industries. 
However, the focus of this piece of work is on the former (section D of the UK SIC92) 
since the output of the innovative activities of the latter are generally not patentable and 
hence the manufacturing industry is where patents are most extensively used. 
The survey was carried out in 2001 and encompasses information on firms’ 
innovative activities during the period 1998-2000. Although one may argue that the 
information analyzed is outdated, there have not been relevant events for our study that 
could raise concerns about the stability of the results. To preserve confidentiality no 
identification of the respondents has been disclosed. Of the 19602 firms drawn from the 
population of 126775 record of the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) a final 
sample of 8172 firms was achieved, of which 3440 from manufacturing. 
3.2  Variables 
Based upon the literature review, we examined firms’ propensities to patent 
using a base specification model which consists of measures of i) innovative capacity, 
ii) firm size, iii) degree of competition, iv) government support, v) technological 
collaborations, and vi) industrial sector. Augmented models incorporate the perceived 
importance of various appropriability mechanisms. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
are presented below (Table 1) and detailed information about each variable follows. 
 
 
   11
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 














































































































3.2.1  Response variable 
Importance of patents. The second part of question 15 of the CIS 3 questionnaire 
poses the following question: “During the period 1998-2000, please indicate the 
importance to your enterprise of the following methods to protect innovations”. The 
importance of patents served as the response variable in our analysis. The respondents 
were given four ordinal categories: not used, low, medium, and high importance. We 
assume that assigning ‘not used’ means that patents had at most marginal importance 
over the period 1998-2000, though we are aware that this is no correction for respondent 
heterogeneity in the interpretation of the rating scales. 
3.2.2  Explanatory variables 
Innovative capacity. If firms do not innovate they are unlikely to apply for 
patents, and hence patents would be of no value to them. Conversely, more innovative   12
firms are hypothesised to be more concerned about reaping the returns from their 
innovative effort, and patents are one of the mechanisms available for this purpose. To 
examine the effects of firms innovative capacity on the importance firms assign to 
patents we used both ex-ante and ex-post measures. The ex-ante measures used in 
different models were R&D expenses, which is a traditional measure of knowledge 
stock, and percentage of staff holding a scientific/ engineering degree. R&D expenses 
were used in logarithmic form to linearise the relationship with patents
3, and were also 
normalized by firm turnover to avoid confounding the effects of the R&D and size 
variables. 
The percentage of firms’ staff educated to science and engineering degree level 
or above was employed to overcome, at least in part, a common criticism of using 
R&D, that is, smaller firms may under report this cost. In the estimation both variables 
refer to the year 2000. One can argue that there is a logical lag between innovating and 
patenting, and hence one would not expect to use contemporaneous values. However, as 
shown in the literature (Blundell et al., 2002; Griliches et al., 1991; Hall and Ziedonis, 
2001), the results of using a lagged structure are roughly the same as the results with 
contemporaneous levels of R&D. We believe the same applies to percentages of 
personnel with scientific degree because on average these variables tend to vary 
marginally over time, and thus the estimates are unlikely to be too inaccurate in a non-
lagged structure. 
As an ex-post measure of innovative capacity a dummy variable for whether or 
not a firm introduced a product new to its industry was used. This is a rough guide as to 
                                                 
3 In models used in this study log values are commonly employed because they tend to result in a better fit (as 
measured by the log-likelihood) than the gross values (Liao, 1994).   13
the degree of innovativeness of a firm since it indicates whether the launched product 
was new not only to the firm. The reason for using this variable is because the ex-ante 
variables above may not portray the commercial potential of the innovation. Although 
some firms may put more emphasis on innovativeness than others, they may not 
necessarily succeed in bring the invention into the market. Moreover, patents are said to 
be applied for at the beginning of the innovation process (Griliches, 1990). 
Firm size. Size may impact on firms’ perceptions of the importance of patents 
because, amongst other things, larger firms are less constrained by the costs of patenting 
activity. We use the logarithm of firm turnover as a measure of their size. Again, this 
variable refers to the year 2000. Unlike other variables, this variable was derived from 
the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) records
4. This was mainly to enlarge 
our sample by avoiding non-response. Five outliers were identified and they were 
adjusted using the CIS 3 data set. If level of patenting is a good proxy for the 
importance of patents we would expect, according to previous studies (Scherer, 1983), 
that the importance of patents is positively associated with firm size. Note however that 
Taylor and Silberston (1973) could not find such a relationship in the UK. 
Degree of competition. The degree of competition may impact on the perception 
of the importance of patents in a number of ways, but the impact is not unambiguous. 
For example, a higher degree of competition may show the weaknesses patents have in 
fully protecting inventions, and hence patents may not be particularly relevant as 
protective devices. Yet, a high number of patents in an industry might be associated 
with a high degree of concentration in that industry. Thus, incumbents would enjoy the 
                                                 
4 The matching (IDBR-CIS) was done by the Department of Trade and Industry. So, that information was available in 
the original CIS dataset.   14
benefits of patents as entry deterrents, and the number of newcomers would be only 
marginal (Levin et al., 1987). In our empirical models an indicator variable representing 
the firm’s largest market is used as a proxy for the degree of competition. The reference 
market was the national one, and other markets were i) local (situated within 
approximately 50 miles), ii) regional (situated within approximately 100 miles), and iii) 
international. We expect firms operating at international/ national level to be in a more 
competitive environment than those operating at local/regional level.  
Government support. A dummy variable was introduced to control for whether 
firms received government support for innovation-related activities. The literature is not 
particularly conclusive about the influence of government support on firms’ patent 
behaviour. However, it is expected that governmental support,  especially financial 
support, is given in exchange for, at best, a reduced license fee to be charged if other 
firms become interested in the innovation (Griliches, 1990). So, patents may become 
less important for those firms that receive support from the government and hence they 
would have limited incentives to pursue patent protection. 
Partnerships. This (dummy) variable was employed to control for companies 
which set up innovation co-operation with other organisations. We are particularly 
interested in firm-university collaborations since universities can be seen as one of the 
major sources of technical knowledge (Trajtenberg et al., 1997). Thus, innovations 
derived from these partnerships are likely to be of higher scientific content, and hence 
likely to be patentable. Moreover, patents may be used as an incentive mechanism for 
the researchers involved. Even if university researchers deem scientific papers more 
valuable than patents, firms engaging in this type of partnership may be more concerned   15
about patenting because of the anticipated interest of university researchers in disclosing 
the results of the joint-project. If they do so before a patent application is filed firms will 
forfeit their rights, since the application will not fulfil at least one of the patentability 
criteria: novelty. 
Relevance of appropriability mechanisms. The mechanisms of protection 
derived from the questionnaire and used in our analysis are: registration of design, 
trademarks, confidentiality agreements, copyright, secrecy, complexity of design, and 
lead-time advantage on competitors. Although not exhaustive they may provide a 
comprehensive overview of how patents are related to them. These variables were 
included in the model in order to investigate how patents interact with other 
mechanisms of protection (e.g. Cassiman et al., 2002; Graham, 2003; Graham and 
Somaya, 2004; Sattler, 2003). Should we find that the importance of one mechanism is 
positively (and statistically significant) related to the importance of patents, these 
mechanisms are likely to be complements. Conversely, a negative (and statistically 
significant) relationship between patents and other methods of protection suggests they 
are likely to be substitutes. 
3.3  Analytical framework 
As observed above, the dependent (or response) variable is not continuous; it 
comes from a four-point opinion scale. Therefore, the data available for our analysis are 
proportions of responses to each category determined by firms with certain attributes 
(e.g. size, industry), and an appropriate approach for such analysis is needed. 
The discrete nature of our response variable demands a model which departs 
from the simple linear form. We are interested in the probability that a firm with certain   16
attributes will fit in some category of our scale. As probabilities are bounded between 
zero and one, a model in a linear form may lead to nonsense probabilities, not to 
mention that the error term will be heteroscedastic (Greene, 2003). Thus, we need to 
seek models that link the probability of an event to a set of factors. 
β)   F(x,     j)     Pr(Y     occurs)   j (event  Pr  = = =  
So, the estimations were carried out using ordered logit models (Appendix A). 
These models are estimated using the principle of maximum likelihood, which provides 
a means of choosing asymptotically efficient estimators for the relating parameters. It 
aims at determining the value(s) of corresponding parameters that would make a sample 
most probable to happen. Next section describes the findings from estimations of 
ordered logit models used in this research and a discussion of the results. 
4  Empirical results 
4.1  Determinants of the importance of patents 
A first look at the importance of patents indicates that patents are relatively 
unimportant in UK manufacturing as compared to other mechanisms (Table 2). Yet 
evidence from the literature suggests that even within industries where patents are 
relatively non-important for protection purposes, one can find firms interested in filing 
many patent applications (Mansfield, 1986). 
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Table 2 
The importance of appropriability mechanisms in UK manufacturing 

















































On average, at least in the UK, industries where patents are regarded more 
important are also industries where patenting activities are more intense (Table 3). 
There are only a few exceptions
5. Although this result contrasts with our initial 
suspicion that the level of patenting may overstate the importance of patents (for 
protection purpose), this is not totally unsurprising. In examining German firms Blind et 
al. (2006) detected that the main reason those firms pursue patents is for protection 
purpose. Thus, their findings suggest the more effective patents are perceived to be the 
more extensively they will be pursued, and our results seem consistent with this. 
However, raw patent numbers say little about firms’ various attributes that lead to a 
more extensive pursuit of patent protection and whether firms use patents and other 
mechanisms interchangeably. It thus seems worth pursuing what factors are likely to 
impact on the importance firms place on patents and whether other methods of 
protection interact with patents.  
 
                                                 
5 For example, firms in the office and computing industry regard patents less important than firms in the electrical 
equipment industry. However, the former presents a higher average number of patent applications than does the latter.   18
Table 3 





  Number of patent applications
b,c
N Mean    N  Mean  Min  Max 
Basic Metals 




Food, beverages and tobacco 
Glass, clay and ceramics 
Machinery (except office) 
Medical and precision instruments 
Motor vehicles 
Office and computing equipments 
Other manufacturing 
Other transport equipment 
Pharmaceuticals 
Printing and Publishing 
Refined petroleum products 
Rubber and plastic products 
Textiles and clothing 



















































































































a Scale from 0 (no importance) to 3 (high importance). 
b 1998-2000. 
c Numbers in bold are column maximum and minimum values. 
In order to investigate whether a set of factors determine the importance firms 
assign to patents, we run ordered logit models where two different variables for 
innovative capacity are used. The purpose of this differentiation in what measures 
innovative capacity was not a mere sample enlargement due to more responses to the 
question on the amount of technical staff than to the question of how much R&D was 
spent. The objective was to identify the impact of non-reporting of R&D on the results. 
It was expected that firms reporting R&D were, on average, larger than those not 
reporting R&D since smaller firms may undertake innovative activities in a less 
structured way, and therefore may not necessarily report this cost. Thus, by relying 
solely upon R&D as a measure of innovative capacity the results could be affected by   19
sample selection bias. In fact, both the average sales and number of employees of 
models (1) and (2) in Table 4 were compared. On average, both sales and number of 
employees are higher for the sample in model (1) than for the sample in model (2). The 
estimation results of model (1) come from a sample which presented in 2000 average 
sales of 50 million pounds and 321 employees, whereas the results of model (2) derive 
from a sample with average sales of 20 million pounds and 181 employees in that year. 
Table 4 
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a Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
b * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
c The reference market is the national one.   20
A clear picture that emerges from Table 4 is that size
6 and partnership with 
universities present persistence across models. But before we move on to the 
interpretation of the results a few remarks should be made about the performance of the 
estimated models. Firstly, as the chi-squares of the models are all significant at 1% level 
the hypothesis that all coefficients equal zero can be rejected. Secondly, the model using 
percentage of personnel with science/ engineering degree to control for innovative 
capacity seems to outperform, in terms of goodness of fit, the model using R&D 
intensity for the same purpose. However, a degree of caution should be exercised when 
examining this because these models differ as to their sample size due to non-responses. 
It would be more sensible to compare estimation models using the same sample. So, if 
the models are limited to the same sample, the one which uses R&D to control for 
innovative capacity performs slightly better than the one using percentage of technical 
staff
7. However, as R&D poses restrictions on our analysis, model (2) is preferable. 
Finally, the proportional odds assumption was checked comparing the log likelihood of 
the estimated models with their binary counterparts, that is, pooling a number of binary 
models equal to the number of categories minus 1 (three in our case). For both models 
the assumptions made could not be rejected
8. That is, the impact of each variable is the 
same on each category of the response variable. 
It is not a surprise that larger firms apply for a larger number of patents than 
smaller firms do. In fact, previous studies have shown firms’ propensities to patent to be 
positively associated with firm size (Scherer, 1965, 1983). As patenting activity 
demands availability of resources for the application and enforcement of patents it is 
                                                 
6 These results were not different when firm size was controlled using firms’ number of employees. 
7 Sample size=413; model (1): pseudo-R
2=0.1063, AIC=2.380; model (2): pseudo-R
2=0.0989, AIC=2.399. 
8 Model (1): p-value=0.5482; model (2): p-value=0.2900.   21
likely that larger firms have an advantage over smaller firms. Besides, economies of 
scale may apply to this type of activity. So, larger firms are likely to incur relatively 
lower costs as compared to smaller firms. Our results add to prior evidence for it also 
shows that larger firms are more likely than smaller firms to consider patents as of high 
importance. Our actual findings could not be totally expected because even if smaller 
firms do not have the financial resources to secure a large portfolio of patents, they 
could regard patents as important as larger firms. 
On the basis of the data set used, there is no proper explanation to justify why 
larger firms are more likely to perceive patents to be more important than are smaller 
firms. Although the pre-empting power of patents is said to be marginal (Gilbert and 
Newbery, 1982; Levin et al., 1987), and patents are not priority when UK firms set up 
their strategies to compete against incumbents and newcomers (Singh et al., 1998), 
patents may add sufficient value at the margin (Cohen et al., 2000). Yet, it seems that 
more value is added to larger firms than to smaller ones. In addition, the existence of 
well defined personnel to deal with patent matters is more likely to be found within 
larger firms than within smaller firms. Thus, the presence of a more formal structure to 
deal with patent issues may not only enable firms to more easily monitor their rivals’ 
patents but also give them a better perception of the role played by patents in their 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, a broader spectrum of smaller firms could be motivated 
to use the patent system if more attention from policy makers was devoted to post-
patenting issues such as renewal, out-licensing, and especially litigation (Kingston, 
2001).   22
Although size effects may raise concerns to policy makers this finding should 
not be interpreted in isolation from other estimation results. Innovative capacity, for 
example, was found to be positively related to the importance of patents. That is, the 
more innovative firms regard patents more important than the less innovative ones do 
(at least according to the metrics used in this study). Thus patents might be playing their 
role in fostering innovation. We also estimated our models replacing the introduction of 
new products by another variable representing whether or not a firm had introduced a 
new process to the industry
9. Again, the importance of patents was detected to be 
positively associated with a higher degree of innovativeness. However, we should 
interpret these last results carefully. First, because the variable was not significant when 
R&D was controlled for
10. And second, because being a process innovator does not 
preclude a firm from being a product innovator. In fact, in our sample half of process 
innovators are also product innovators
11. In line with previous studies (e.g. Levin et al., 
1987), the perceived importance of patents seem to be smaller to process innovations 
than to product innovations. 
Regarding competition, it is noticeable (model (2)) that patents are judged more 
important by those operating in more competitive environments. Taking the national 
market as a point of reference, the likelihood that patents will be regarded highly 
important as opposed to medium, low or not important decreases for less competitive 
markets (local and regional) and increases for a more competitive market 
                                                 
9 We attempted to estimate models with variables for both product and process innovations simultaneously but we 
could not avoid collinearity and hence they were discarded. 
10 The estimates for the introduction of novel process innovations are the following when we control for R&D and for 
technical skills, respectively: i) 0.218 (Wald test= 0.91; p-value=0.364), and ii) 0.546 (Wald test=3.43; p-
value=0.001). 
11 Of the total number firms in our full sample (N=3440) 271 reported to have implemented a process new to their 
industry, 137 of which also reported to have introduced new products to the industry. The total number of firms 
reporting introduction of new products (regardless of whether or not introduced new processes) was 451.   23
(international). This, however, does not hold in model (1). This is because the sample in 
this model comprises on average larger firms, as was described earlier. So, even if the 
major markets are local and regional, for example, they might be part of a group of 
companies which has a patent policy dictated by the head office. Another possible 
explanation for the degree of competition not being significant when R&D is taken into 
account is that R&D intensity itself may reflect competition. So, effects of competition 
may be embedded in the R&D variable. These arguments however are unlikely to apply 
to the proportion of personnel educated in science and engineering. 
The results also indicate that the relationship between the importance of patents 
and the support received by the government is positive and significant. However, the 
estimate for government support in model (1) is not only insignificant but also goes in 
the opposite direction of the coefficient of model (2). The sub-set of firms that declared 
to have received support in model (1) consists of 56% of small, medium-sized firms 
(less than 250 employees) and 44% of large firms (250 employees or above). In turn, 
the group of firms that reported to have received government support in model (2) is 
composed of 75% of small, medium-sized firms and 25% of large firms. Thereby, 
perhaps a larger proportion of smaller firms receiving support from the government is 
conducive to a higher likelihood of assigning more importance to patents (holding other 
things constant). 
Another result from this study is that partnerships with universities seem to 
influence the perceived importance of patents. Firms which set up partnerships with 
universities are more likely to regard patents as more important than firms that do not 
establish this type of partnership. This result could be expected to a certain degree since   24
firms may wish to avoid losing proprietary control over the output of this type of 
partnership. Especially, because it is well known that an important element of university 
researchers’ reputation building process is the sharing of their work with their peers. If 
they do so before a patent is applied for, property rights will not be secured. Hence, 
firms engaged in this type of collaboration will be better off if they seek patent 
protection before the invention is publicly disclosed somewhere else. The question that 
arises is whether this would also hold for other types of partners. 
Table 5 
Effects of the innovation partner on the importance of patents 
Type of partner 
Variants of model (1)  Variants of model (2) 
Coeff.
a  Wald test p-value Coeff.







































































a Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
To understand whether the nature of the partner causes any change in the 
perceived importance of patents, parallel models were estimated investigating how the 
estimates for partnership differed across types of partner. More specifically, four other 
partners were studied: firms within own group, suppliers, clients, and competitors. The 
results are reported in Table 5
12 and indicate that for no other partnership is the 
importance of patents increased. That is, only joint-innovation projects with universities 
seem to be conducive to a higher likelihood of firms assigning a higher importance to 
                                                 
12 The same sort of results was achieved in models (3) and (4).   25
patents. This might be a surprising result because a previous study of Brouwner and 
Kleinknetch (1999) indicates that R&D collaborations increase firms’ propensities to 
patent. We should then expect a positive (and significant) impact of the estimates of 
innovation partner variable on the importance of patents. 
Relationships amongst researchers are built over time and are dependent on 
successful and trustful exchanges (Bouty, 2000). Regarding intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) issues, Hagedoorn et al. (2003) have found that the number of joint-patents is 
positively associated with previous experience in sharing this type of property rights 
and is not associated with previous R&D alliances. So, it may be that firms have learned 
to share property rights with universities more quickly than with other partners. In 
addition, universities have increasingly seen collaborations with industries as an 
important source of revenue and income (Panagopoulos, 2003), which means that they 
need to fulfil industries’ expectations if a successful relationship is aimed. Certainly, an 
important issue regards intellectual property rights, especially because of the nature of 
the university researchers’ profession described earlier (i.e., scientific publications). 
On the basis of the findings presented earlier, one cannot reject the hypotheses 
that i) the importance of patents varies by firm size, ii) patents are more important for 
firms with greater innovative capacity, iii) competition is to a certain extent conducive 
to a greater importance for patents, and iv) innovation collaboration and government 
support may increase the importance of patents depending on the agents engaged in 
these activities. However, this exercise has neglected the effects of other contingencies 
on the appropriation process, which are presented next.   26
4.2  The relationship between patents and other mechanisms 
So far our empirical effort has concentrated upon identifying firms’ various 
attributes that make them more or less prone to pursue patents. Yet, firms may decide 
whether (or not) to use patents when choosing how to appropriate the returns from 
innovation because there might be other mechanisms more suitable for that purpose. To 
date few studies have considered this issue, which is pivotal to our understanding of 
firms’ strategic behaviour regarding appropriability. In order to depict at least in part 
this phenomenon we have estimated how firms’ perception of the importance of patents 
varies according to the importance they assign to other appropriability mechanisms.  
The estimates concerning each appropriability mechanism are presented in 
ascending order of importance from top to bottom and the baseline was the non-
importance of each mechanism (Table 6). The picture that emerges from our estimations 
is that the likelihood of regarding patents highly important as opposed to medium, low 
or not important increases whenever another appropriability mechanism is also ranked 
highly important. Our findings suggest that the use of a particular mechanism does not 
preclude the use of patents. Thus, the mechanisms investigated in our analysis are more 
likely to work as complements rather than substitutes for patents in protecting the 
returns from innovation. Our results therefore are in line with prior findings by Graham 
(2003), and by Graham and Somaya (2004). 
Our results lend support for the theoretical proposition by Anton and Yao (2004) 
who suggest that firms do not decide to use either patents or secrecy, rather what a firm 
has to decide is how much knowledge will be disclosed. So, the use of patents and other 
mechanisms depend on the degree of appropriability of the knowledge created, and   27
some mechanisms are more suitable to protect the codified part of knowledge and others 
to protect the tacit part of knowledge. For example, Arora (1997) posits that the tacit 
part of the knowledge is better protected by secrecy whilst the codified part by patents. 
In addition, the degree of appropriability tends to fall over time because more 
agents become able to codify the innovators’ tacit knowledge and transform this 
codified knowledge on their own tacit knowledge (Saviotti, 1998). Also, the process of 
codification is demanded by innovators themselves because knowledge has to be 
communicated in order to be embodied into innovations and hence there is a risk of 
knowledge disclosure even if patents are not applied for. Thus, sooner or later other 
agents become able to interpret the tacit knowledge held by the innovator as long as 
they have access to its embodied form, and hence alternative modes of appropriability 
are needed. As it is particularly difficult to detect the extent rival firms are able to 
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Table 6 
Effects of the importance of appropriability mechanisms on the importance of patents
a,b 
Appropriability  




































































































































































































































































a Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
b * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.   29
5  Concluding Remarks 
Using a unique survey-based dataset this paper detects what firms’ attributes 
affect their perception of the importance of patents. In addition, this paper investigates 
whether the importance of patents is influenced by the importance of other 
appropriability mechanisms. We use ordered logit models to analyse firm level data 
from the UK Community Innovation Survey and our results, to a large degree although 
not totally, match previous studies of this kind. This suggests that contrary to our 
expectations patent numbers may be a good proxy for evaluating the importance of 
patents as a mechanism of protection, but only if firms’ other attributes are controlled 
for. This also suggests that despite the multifaceted role played by patents the main 
purpose of those who use the patent system is to protect their inventions against 
copying. However, our results reinforce the view that the use of patents as an innovation 
indicator needs to be carefully interpreted because they may understate the 
innovativeness of firms for a number of reasons (e.g., size, industrial sector). 
Overall, our findings are that one cannot reject the hypotheses that i) the 
importance of patents varies across industrial sectors and by firm size, ii) patents are 
more important for firms with greater innovative capacity, iii) competition is to a certain 
extent conducive to a greater importance for patents, and iv) innovation collaboration 
and government support may increase the importance of patents depending on the 
agents engaged in these activities. One result that deserves further attention regards the 
effect of innovation collaborations. Brouwner and Kleinknecht (1999) studied 
propensities to patent in the Dutch manufacturing industry and found that R&D 
collaborations positively impact on those propensities. Our results corroborate their 
results only in part; we found that in the UK firms that have established joint innovation   30
collaborations with universities deem patents as of more importance than firms that 
have not set up this kind of partnership. But, we did not find that the same applies to 
other types of partnerships. As the estimates of Brouwner and Kleinknecht (1999) are at 
more aggregate level than ours we do not know to what extent our results really differ. 
As partnerships and intellectual property appear to have become topical it seems 
important to ask why different partners impact differently on firms’ propensities to 
patent; an issue that clearly deserves future research. 
Our paper also explores the relationship between patents and other 
appropriability mechanisms. In particular, we look at how patents interact with i) 
confidentiality agreements, ii) secrecy, iii) copyright, iv) design registration, v) 
trademarks, vi) design complexity, and vii) lead-time. Our findings indicate that firms 
tend to combine patents with other appropriability mechanisms to enhance the degree of 
appropriability over their inventions. Taken as a whole, the results support earlier 
empirical evidence on the complementary role of patents. Based upon an econometric 
framework that accounts for some properties of the response variable, and upon a 
number of mechanisms and industrial sectors, the findings of our investigation have 
contributed to advance our existing knowledge on whether patents interact with other 
mechanisms. If knowledge takes the forms of codified and tacit, the information 
disclosed by patents may not be necessarily damaging if tacit knowledge is retained by 
the innovator. Thus, the drawbacks of patents as to be circumvented or to disclose 
technical information seem to be less harmful in many ways than having an innovation 
reverse-engineered and launched on the market by a competitor.   31
This study presents limitations that should be borne in mind, needless to say the 
limitations of survey-based studies. A clear limitation is that appropriation strategies 
may be a result of so many factors that no single empirical work can explicitly control 
for them all, and thus further empirical research is needed. Moreover, as the importance 
of the mechanisms of appropriability may vary throughout the innovation process, our 
approach may not capture the exact way they interact. Clearly, much else remains to be 
learned but these are just a few avenues of research that merit further attention. 
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Appendix A – Ordered Logit Models Framework 
Models for ordered data, also known as ordered polychotomous univariate 
models, assume that the dependent variable y is generated by a latent variable y* whose 
values are not observed. It is a function of the vector x, and of the vector β of unknown 
parameters. It also has a disturbance term which is assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed, with zero mean and a shared cumulative density function F 
which is known up to a scaling parameter (Gourieroux, 2000). This latent variable can 
be considered random and is defined by:   32
ε + = β x' * y  
What we observe is the value of each alternative (y) of the choice set. So, 
assuming that our first alternative of the choice set is zero (as it is in fact in our case) 
and the last alternative is J, the observed values can be represented as follows: 
0 y =   if   1 * α ≤ y  
1 y =   if   2 1 * α α ≤ < y  




J = y  i f    * y J < α  
Where   J α α α < < < ... 2 1  are the threshold parameters. Then, from the above we 
can define the following probabilities using logistic distribution, which is a monotonic 
differentiable function that also allows for the probabilities to be bounded between zero 
and one, that is,  0 ) ( ≥ z f  and  ∫
+∞
∞ −
=1 ) ( dz z f . 
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One can notice from the above that the parameters are not linearly related to the 
dependent variable since we chose a logistic distribution for the disturbance term.  In 
other words, we are assuming that the error terms are independent and identically 
Gumbel (or type I extreme value) distributed (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 2000). 
The interpretation of the estimates is straightforward. A positive sign of a 
coefficient indicates an increased chance that a subject with a higher score on the 
corresponding explanatory variable will be observed in a higher category. Hence, a 
negative coefficient indicates that the chances that a subject with a higher score on the 
independent variable will be observed in a lower category (Zavoina and McKelvey, 
1975). Unfortunately the same straightforwardness does not apply when measuring the 
goodness of fit of these models. Unlike ordinary least square regression (OLS), there is 
no single measure that reflects proportion of the variance accounted for. Overall, a 
starting point to measure the goodness of fit of this type of model is using the likelihood 
ratio (LR) test statistic.  In order to measure goodness of fit it is commonly employed a 
transformation of the likelihood ratio, which is the likelihood ration index, also known 
as pseudo-R2. There exist other possibilities but for our purposes we will use the 
McFadden’s-R2, which varies between zero and 1 but values between 0.20 and 0.40 are 
considered an excellent fit (McFadden, 1979). 
It might be valid to say that a model with a higher likelihood ratio index fits the 
data better. But this is only true if the models were estimated on the same sample and 
with the same set of alternatives. If we are estimating models with different covariates, 
but with the same set of alternatives (i.e. the same response variable), the Akaike’s 
Information Criterion (AIC) might be useful (Akaike, 1973). The smaller the value of   34
the AIC, the better the fit of the model to the observed data. The AIC, unlike the 
Likelihood Ratio Test, has been used to select among non-nested models. 
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